Ei gwrol ryfelwyr are words sung in the opening verse on the Welsh National Anthem, Hen Wlad Fy Nhadau (Land of My Fathers)- an anthem sending tingles down anyone’s spine when belted out on a cold autumn night in Cardiff, their renditions against Republic of Ireland and Hungary in November of 2017 and 2019 respectively being the most spectacular. Ei gwrol ryfelwyr, meaning ‘her brave warriors’. A particularly apt part of the national anthem, especially in a footballing context- since 2014, Wales have been a side continually punching above their weight with an indomitable team spirit which saw them become the smallest nation to reach a European Championship semi-final in 2016. After narrowly missing out on Russia 2018, the nation of just 3.1 million people turned round a disastrous start to Euro 2020 qualifying to reach their 2nd major tournament in 4 years, despite not having reached any between 1958 and 2016, a drought of 58 years.
But what were the reasons for the turnaround? Did Ryan Giggs add to his tactical arsenal in the hiatus months of the summer? Did individual players merely experience personal upturns in form, translating it on to the international scene? Or did Giggs find a formula which better utilised the key parts of the Welsh squad, notably the wide areas in attack? The latter has been the most common explanation- understandably at a surface level as Wales’ performances significantly improved from the Slovakia trip in October onwards- a game which involved Kieffer Moore, a bustling target man, for the first time in a competitive outing. His hold-up play and ability to link in the forward line, allowing Bale and Dan James to flourish more was the common narrative.
However, this narrative is often one-dimensional, focusing solely on his role and impact in the attacking third and fails to look at the knock-on effects his involvement had in the other thirds of the pitch. His involvement has been a key turning point, but not just due to the typical aspect of being a ‘dangerous threat’ in the box.
The June international break seemed like a death knell for Giggs’ tenure as Wales manager- yes they are a small nation, but on paper had the 2nd best squad in the group behind World Cup runners up Croatia, with Slovakia and Hungary lacking the same star names as the Welsh squad. After a reasonable 1-0 win over Slovakia in Cardiff in March, their trips to Osijek and Budapest brought home nothing, going down to 2-1 and 1-0 defeats to the Vatreni and Magyarok respectively. The argument that they had clear chances to get a draw or even a win in Hungary falls short when one considers that Hungary similarly missed guilt-edged chances themselves.
Their line-ups for the games were similar, albeit missing Aaron Ramsey through injury. The line-up against Hungary, , had 4 changes from the side that lost to Croatia 3 days earlier- Ashley Williams coming in at centre back for James Lawrence, Chris Gunter, record appearance maker, coming in at right back for Connor Roberts, Ethan Ampadu replaced Matthew Smith in the double pivot and Tom Lawrence replaced Harry Wilson at right wing (Hennessey- Gunter, Williams, J. Lawrence, Davies- Allen, Ampadu- T. Lawrence, Brooks, James- Bale). Though these changes made sense on paper, namely the more physical and experienced Williams and Gunter coming into the defence to deal with the brute strength of Hungary’s front line in Ádám Szalai and Filip Holender, their lack of pace was exposed alongside their limitations in feeding the wings and the midfield double pivot in attacking transition. Going forward, in this period of the Giggs era Wales were heavily dependent on Joe Allen drifting out into the half spaces to feed an advanced Gunter or Roberts, or a member of the front 4 running in behind the defensive line, the general attacking tactic being to funnel the ball into creative and pacey wide channels- so obvious that in all of the short highlights packages of Wales’ qualifiers, whether pre of post-Moore, the overwhelming majority of their attacks come from wide areas, overlaps or not .
For example, in this attacking move, after receiving the ball from Ampadu. Covering at right tback, Allen drives into the half space, uses the advanced Gunter to play a give-and-go, taking out the Hungarian left back, and faciliating a low cross to the feet of the onrushing Lawrence who couldn’t quite divert it into the net.
However, the advanced posiiton of the Welsh full backs were a double-edged sword, as they were highly succeptible to balls in behind the defensive line throuh the half spaces. This can be seen with this chance for Hungary; the fluid nature of the front 4 obfuscated the defensive duties of each member, meaning that Allen gets dragged out wide to help Davies in pressing the right winger Balázs Dzsudzsák, allowing a massive gap for Dzsudzsák to slip the ball through the half space to the onrushing Szalai, as you can see in the photo begins his dart in behind, whose drilled cross across goal just misses the feet of the sliding Holender. Perhaps the most worrying aspect of continual examples of this wasn’t even the lack of defensive sturctural patterns, if not that Williams’ legs have gone to such an extent that he was getting done for pace by 6ft3 target man in Ádám Szalai (though he is admittedly less clunky than one might think).
Going back into attack, the overarching purpose of shifting the ball through Allen was to ultimately the funnel the ball into wide areas, where the quality in the Welsh side is concentrated. This was how Dan James scored his goal vs Slovakia in March, and also what Wales aimed to do in Budapest, with James, 24 minutes in, picking the ball up in his own half after a ball in which Allen was the fulcrum, then driving all the way into the Hungarian box. In fact, so driven were Wales to do this that they often lost the ball trying to rapidly switch the play to wide areas, such as Matthew Smith losing the ball whilst trying to quickly transfer the ball from the left flank to the right in the 76th minute.
Still, this plan falls short if there is a lack of a focal point in the box. Brooks, Bale and Lawrence did this occasionally and rotated responsibility, but ultimately as vagrants if too often depended on spur of the moment decision making. The image to the right, here, is a rare example of Bale being the focal point of the front three whilst simultaneously having a free run on goal ahead of him, and this was only facilitated by a shockingly executed offside trap from Hungary.
Overall, it was a performance that lacked tactical clarity, and after a similarly ad hoc performance against Azerbaijan in September, Wales arrived at a crucial international break in October needing at least a point in Slovakia. And so in came Kieffer Moore.
With the introduction of Moore, the system became more rigid. Despite this, there were still examples of Moore drifting away from centre to the wide areas to help in funnelling the ball out wide. A common theme would be for one of the centre backs to aim a chipped ball to Moore, who would subsequently bring it down and feed the wide men of Bale and James from closer range. However, centrally, Allen and Ampadu continued to drop deep to help with the build-up play. Essentially, Moore is an occasional accelerator of the process of funnelling into wide areas, whilst simultaneously offering a focal point.
Occasionally Bale and James tucked in to dovetail Moore as inside forwards, however their most fruitful moves, and their only goal of the game came through one of these direct shifts of the ball to the wide areas. Their goal was remarkably simple- a long switch of play from Bale was brilliantly brought down by James, who after a bit of jinking and tussling, put in a lovely clipped ball for Moore who prodded it in across goal with a strong leap. Clipped balls in became a regular feature, the wingers relishing the fact that a regular and reliable target was there to be found in and around the penalty spot.
However, given that it’s understood that Giggs introduced Moore primarily to be a focal point that Wales had lacked previously, it is somewhat counter-intuitive that his most successful function has been a defensive one, and not just one regarding set pieces. Defensively, and in defensive transition, the role of Moore has often been overlooked. The contrast between their defensive structures against Hungary and Slovakia is startling.
As these stills show, against Hungary there was little if any cohesive defensive structure, with the centre midfielders not knowing when to cover the box or when to press, nor the full backs knowing whether to tuck in or remain wide. It didn’t resemble a 4-2-3-1 nor a 4-4-2, the most common defensive shapes with 4-man defences. Even between the back 4 the structure had been lost, with Williams being dragged out despite the ball being the farther right of the Hungarian centre midfielders. This was at least in part caused by the fluid front 4, who didn’t consistently perform defensive duties in wide areas, forcing makeshift defensive and pressing actions from the centre midfielders, where they would be dragged into wide areas and lose structure. Whereas, against Slovakia, the introduction of Moore provided a knock-on effect for a cohesive shape. In the latter still, Moore is the first trigger of the press in a clear 4-4-2, with Bale and James holding down the right and left flank respectively and Jonny Williams supporting Moore in pressing and cutting out passing lanes. The match ended 1-1 after a driven strike from Juraj Kucka just after half time, though hardly a goal Wales could blame themselves for.
This structure became all the more crucial in the following game against Croatia, ending in a 1-1 draw, where they restricted them to few chances and most heart in mouth moments came from when Croatia surprised Wales with their directness, a rare trait for a side featuring an elegant midfield pivot of Mateo Kovačić and Luka Modrić. Croatia’s goal stemmed from one of the few examples of a lapse in concentration from the Welsh- here Ampadu got dragged towards chasing the ball, abandoning the position he would normally cover where Nikola Vlašić, the Croatian closest to the edge of The D in this still, drilled in the opener unmarked. There nonetheless remained some feeling of the ‘Old Wales’ though, such as in the 2nd half, where perhaps by overpowering will to cling on to the draw, the centre midfielders started to drift into centre back again.
In this game going forward, less of Moore was seen: in one sense understandably as Croatia had 66% possession, but in another slightly confusingly- the emphasis of attacks in this game came down to individual brilliance more than their insistence on playing in wide areas, perhaps strangely given A- arguably Croatia’s weakest areas are their full backs and B- it is surely no coincidence that Croatia’s poorest performances in the past 2 years have been in games where their pair of centre backs have struggled with a target man taking them out of the game (Szalai for Hungary in March 2019, Giroud in the World Cup final). Nonetheless, they were good value for their draw and went into the November break knowing that 2 wins would certainly seal automatic qualification.
They swept aside Azerbaijan in Baku with 2 early goals; a feat that shouldn’t be overlooked given how fortunate they were to eventually net a late winner against them in Cardiff in September. Buoyed by an infectious home crowd against Hungary in a stunningly good new home kit, Wales produced their best performance of the qualification campaign, and no coincidence that this was due to the return of Aaron Ramsey, and not just because of his two goals. Their opening goal was a beautiful tapestry of all of Wales’ best elements under Giggs and a culmination of their typical patterns, fitting for their final game- Allen, drifting into the half space, plays it out wide to the advanced Roberts, who releases Bale down the right flank, who checks in, and clips in a delicious cross the onrushing Ramsey playing as an Enganche, who glances home the header. More broadly, having Ramsey back provided a better advanced pivot to divert balls into the front three for as well an added goal threat on the edge of the box- Ramsey is an underrated player in that Lampardian role. They similarly were caught out by balls in behind, which led to their only heart in mouth moment of the match where Wayne Hennessey made a fine double stop in the 34th minute. The most striking element of the performance however was Wales’ relentlessness- unlike any of the qualifiers before them, with the exception of a poor Azerbaijan in Baku, Wales didn’t cease possession and panic in the final half hour, and instead they pushed on, and arguably looked more threatening the more the game progressed, with Dan James and Bale seemingly fitter and more energetic in the final tens of minutes than previous games.
The two sides are different, the current one boosted by a wider array of attacking options, but this current edition may just be even better than the side at Euro 2016 under Chris Coleman. That’s not to say that Wales will make the final this time round, or even the semis, quarters or knockouts at all given a tough group including Italy, Switzerland and Turkey, factoring in a lengthy and arduous journey to Baku. It’s a group where they can pick up points anywhere and lose them anywhere. But play like they did against Hungary in their final qualification campaign, with Ramsey and Bale in the right mood, Allen back to full fitness, the proper utilisation of Moore and the hope that Connor Roberts, Rodon, Ben Cabango, Joe Morrell, Brooks, Ampadu, Lawrence and Rabbi Matondo continue to grow and Wales will be really exciting. Let’s just see if Giggs can make other simple improvements (he’s done few others bar Moore), to get more out of his squad- Wales improved greatly October onwards, but Giggs is, ultimately, not the prime reason for this and still (rightfully) needs to convince most of the Welsh faithful over.
I look forward to (hopefully) seeing what they have in store at Euro 2020(1).
Pictures thanks to Sky Sports Football, UEFA.com, UEFA.tv and to the BBC.
By Alfie Wilson