A TACTICAL ANALYSIS OF AUSTRALIA IN THE 2018 FIFA WORLD CUP
The Australian’s have never progressed from the group stages other than the 2006 World Cup in Germany, last time in Russia they achieved only one point, but can they count themselves unlucky based on the games and opponents they played?
Australia, admittedly is not a footballing hotbed. The main sports in Australia are Cricket, Australian Rules Football and Rugby League, all of which coming before football. But considering some of the players that have been produced ‘Down Under’ can Australia consider their performances in major competitions disappointing? Here we take a look at their last outing in Russia.
Under the tutorship of Dutchman Bert Van Marwijk, Australia finished bottom of their group, with one solitary point. However, it can be argued that it was an extremely tough group to be place in. They came up against eventual World Cup winners France, and by all accounts gave a good showing, albeit going down 2-1. Second game, they faced a tough Danish side with quality throughout, they secured a point against the Danes. Finally, they played Peru, who somewhat surprised fans with their showing, although they didn’t progress, they notched their first World Cup win against Australia.
STRATEGY:
(FIFA.com)
In Possession:
In Possession, Van Marwijk favoured playing out from the back. His defensive preference suggested this as well through Trent Sainsbury, who, in his own right is good on the ball, and is suited to playing out from the back. Often you would find the centre-backs splitting to offer a short pass from the keeper, with the full-backs pushed on somewhat, although not as high as some other teams when playing from the back.
In possession, especially when the ball was in the defensive third, Australia were extremely rigid. You can see the 4-2-3-1 formation clearly. What is noticeable is that of the two central midfielders, Mile Jedinak was the deeper pivot, with Aaron Mooy operating slightly advanced. Like previously suggested, the full-backs do not operate high and wide. Instead they push on slightly, Risdon and Behich operate with more caution, this could potentially be due to the strengths of the opposition wide players. Despite this, they do still offer a passing angle with space to penetrate.
What is also noticeable is that the three attacking players behind the centre forward are very narrow. It does suggest that Australia operated in a way that encouraged being narrow, potentially as a vote of caution should the ball turn over. The narrowness of the team shape whilst in possession would enable them to be in a position to smother the opposition in the central areas of the pitch. This was especially noticeable in the game vs France, an instruction to limit the influence of Paul Pogba.
Australia’s cautious approach when in possession was evident when entering the final third as well. Australia attacked with the front four with Jedinak and Mooy operating deeper, to be present to stop a potential counter attack.
Interestingly as well, Australia only attacked with one full-back. If the ball was on the left side in the attacking third, then Josh Risdon would form a back three, this was especially apparent when Australia didn’t have to chase the game, due to being a goal down.
Out of Possession:
Like most teams from the 2018 FIFA World Cup, Australia preferred to be compact and relatively deep when out of possession, operating for the most part in a mid-block.
Australia were very rigid as well, there was a show of a 4-2-3-1 when out of possession as well. Often when teams press in a 4-2-3-1 it can become a 4-4-2 with the number 10 joining the striker in engaging the opposition, however, Rogic dropping off suggested a conscious effort to fill the midfield in a block that made progressive passing difficult for the opposition.
Despite this, Australia often defended in a 4-4-2 when defending in a low block in their defensive third, with both centre forward and attacking midfielder dropping deep, as shown below in their game with France.
Australia also deployed a zonal-marking system, as is the case with the vast majority of teams. The understanding between Mooy and Jedinak was crucial, as zonal-marking is all about marking a space rather than a man. The above photo also shows Jedinak moving out of the flat-four to engage the opposition player entering the zone he’s responsible for. The understanding between Jedinak and Mooy was apparent as Mooy avoided being dragged over to combat the opponent, especially as another opponent had drifted into the space he was responsible for.
You can also see from the photo that Australia retained their narrow defensive mentality to suffocate space in the middle and invite play into wide areas.
Also, what became apparent when analysing Australia, is that in their defensive organisation, they favoured overloading the ball side. This means that they, again, wanted to be narrow and suffocate the space where the play was. The below photo demonstrates this. The below photo also shows that Australia revert to a 4-4-2 when the initial line of engagement is broken.
Below, is shows Australia’s movement and patterns when in and out of possession, summarised by FIFA’s technical support group.
(FIFA.com)
The above figure re-affirms the statements made, especially when out of possession, the graph shows that Australia largely still kept to a rigid 4-2-3-1 with the line of engagement, or the initial press is made close to the half way line. This suggests that Van Marwijk wanted his side to work to a mid-block with a real emphasis on maintaining a narrow shape to suffocate the spaces in the middle, especially in and around Zone 14.
Conclusion
It could be argued that Australia were somewhat unlucky. Their defensive shape and patterns were largely good, and it was evident to see that it was worked on relentlessly, and they put out a good showing in largely nullifying France, with them conceding to a penalty and an unfortunate goal scored by Paul Pogba. In addition to this, although conceding to Denmark, the Danish team possess attacking talent, and again they largely looked capable when out of possession.
However, Australia’s problems came at the other end of the pitch. 100% of the goals scored by Australia (2) came from Jedinak from the penalty spot. Their attacking fragilities were displayed. Despite this though, it can be said that this could largely be due to the rigidness of the system they played, when in possession, they operated a rigid 4-2-3-1, with little rotations. What was noticeable too, was that Mooy was operating deeper, he could have had the potential to unlock defences if operated higher up the pitch.
Despite this, I still feel Australia have good and capable players, and I don’t see it unlikely that they can establish themselves as a team that is able to reach the knockout stages, it was just on this occasion in Russia they struggled to attack with real intent. Moving forward it will be interesting to see how Australia develop tactically.
By Russell Pope